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Abstract: 
This paper argues that global value chains (GVCs) have transformed bilateral trade 
relations into multilateral and value added approach is needed to accurately 
measure the contribution of trade to economic growth and bilateral trade balances. 
Under GVCs, the impact of exchange rates on bilateral trade balances have been 
weakened and technological innovations may not necessarily increase domestic 
employment. The challenges associated with the emergence of GVCs require an in-
depth understanding of modern international trade, which in turn calls for new modes 
of thinking and new theories. For developing countries, focusing on specific 
segments of GVCs and upgrading industrial capacity along value chains could be an 
alternative path of industrialization.  
JEL: F1  
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1. Introduction 
Unlike the US, China remains a labor abundant country and clearly has no 
comparative advantage in the production of either capital-intensive or technology-
intensive products. Nevertheless, China has a huge trade surplus with the US, not 
only in labor-intensive products, but also in high-tech products. According to the US 
Census Bureau (2011), in 2010 the US had a US$94 billion trade deficit with China 
in advanced technology products.  Take for example that trendiest of high-tech 
gadgets, the iPhone: all iPhones sold in the US market are actually imported from 
China. That one product accounted for $1.9 billion of the 2009 US trade deficit in 
bilateral trade (Xing and Detert, 2010). The prevailing pattern of China-US trade in 
high-tech products seems to contradict classic comparative advantage theory, which 
would predict that China would import high-tech products from the US, and not vice 
versa.  
Despite three and half decades of rapid growth, China is still at the catching-up 
stage, having just achieved middle-income country status. The GDP per capita of 
China is far less than that of developed countries. There are few industries where 
Chinese indigenous firms are world leaders. Trade statistics on global high-tech 
trade, on the other hand, present an unexpected phenomenon: China has surpassed 
the US, Japan and 27 EU countries, emerging as the top high-tech exporting nation 
(Meri, 2009). Industrialized countries are now the main destinations for China’s high-
tech exports.  
To explain puzzles such as those seen in the iPhone trade and China’s high-tech 
export dominance, it is necessary to turn away from classic comparative advantage 
theory as it relates to international trade and examine the fundamental changes in 
the organizations of international trade and their implications for trade patterns and 
national comparative advantage. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue that 
today’s trade is no longer clothes for wine; it differs significantly from the trade 
discussed by the British economist David Ricardo some 200 years ago. Modern 
international trade has evolved from trade in tasks to trade in goods. Almost all 
manufacturing products are now produced and traded along global value chains 
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(GVCs), where many firms located in geographically dispersed countries are 
involved in tasks ranging from research and development to the final delivery of 
products to end users in the global market. Technological innovations and extensive 
outsourcing by multinational enterprises (MNEs) now direct and amplify trade flows, 
reshaping geographic trade patterns and balances.  
GVCs involve complicated trade relationships between nations; they have 
transformed bilateral trade relationships into multilateral ones. In any GVC, firms 
from various countries jointly contribute to the value added of the final products. 
Export figures, measured as the gross value of goods crossing borders, tend to 
exaggerate the actual export capacity and technology advancement of the exporting 
nations. Current estimates of comparative advantage based on conventional trade 
statistics have significant biases and are no longer reliable indicators of national 
comparative advantage or competitiveness. Furthermore, an individual country 
participating in a GVC accounts for only a part of the entire value added of goods 
manufactured in that chain. The appreciation or depreciation of a country’s currency 
should have a limited effect, impacting at most on the cost of tasks performed by 
that country’s workers, not on the cost of tasks performed by firms in other countries. 
In that sense, GVCs mitigate the pass-through effect of exchange rates and limit the 
importance (in terms of trade balances) of an individual country’s currency 
fluctuations.  
The emergence of GVCs in the world economy has been bolstered by 
unprecedented globalization, changes in MNE strategy, and technological advances 
such as revolutionary technological innovation in information and communications, 
the backbone of international coordination, management and logistics. As 
multinational enterprises continue to slice the production process into relatively 
independent tasks and optimize production by allocating or outsourcing those tasks 
to geographically dispersed firms, developing countries encounter new opportunities 
to join the globalization phenomenon. By participating in GVCs established by MENs, 
firms from developing countries can overcome their capital and technology 
disadvantages and take part in the global market. Spillover from lead firms’ 
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intellectual property, such as technological innovations, brands and global 
distribution networks, enable firms from developing countries to benefit from the 
growth of international markets and generate opportunities for those firms to learn 
and move to higher ladders of value chains. The worldwide proliferation of GVCs, 
therefore, opens an alternative path to industrialization. China’s success in the 
processing trade and Thailand’s emergence as the Asian hub for the export of 
pickup trucks can be attributed in large part to their active participation in GVCs.  
In this paper, I will briefly outline the primary changes in international trade resulting 
from the emergence of GVCs and the way in which developing countries could 
benefit from participating in GVCs. In particular, I will focus on new trade 
relationships under value chains, the need to measure trade in terms of value added, 
and new thinking regarding the nexus between trade and exchange rates. Further, to 
illustrate the mechanics of this new model of industrialization under GVCs, I will 
examine the successful experiences of China and Thailand.  
2. What are Global Value Chains? 
A global value chain is a sequential composite of the tasks necessary for the 
production of a product, from conception to delivery to end consumers in 
international markets, a process including research and development, product 
design, parts and components manufacturing, assembly and distribution. These 
tasks are carried out by firms in different countries (Gereffi and Karina, 2011). 
Depending on the governance structure, i.e. the identity of the managers and 
leaders of a value chain, a GVC can be classified as producer-driven or buyer-driven. 
Producer-driven chains are generally developed by technology leaders in capital-
intensive industries such as the automobile, aircraft, computer, semiconductor 
industries. The automobile value chains led by Toyota and the electronics chains 
(iPod, iPhone and iPad) led by Apple are producer-driven value chains. Buyer-driven 
value chains are typically developed by large retailers and brand marketers, e.g., 
H&M, GAP and Walmart (Gereffi, 1999).   
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The most frequently cited example of a value chain is that of Apple’s iPhone. The 
manufacture of the iPhone, which is at the technology frontier of mobile 
communication, involves a series of complex tasks. The product description on the 
back of each iPhone, “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China,” 
declares unambiguously that iPhone is made neither in the US, nor in China, but 
rather in the world. The iPhone is designed and marketed by Apple, one of the most 
innovative US companies. Apart from software and product design, the production of 
iPhone components and assembly of iPhones takes place primarily outside the US. 
The manufacture of 3G iPhones involves nine companies, located in China, Korea, 
Japan, Germany, and the US. The major producers and suppliers of iPhone parts 
and components include Toshiba, Samsung, Infineon, Broadcom, Numunyx, Murata, 
Dialog Semiconductor and Cirrius Logic. All iPhone components produced by these 
companies are shipped to Foxconn, a Taiwan-based company, for assembly into 
final products in Shenzhen, China and export to the global market. As the lead firm 
of the value chain, Apple sets the product standards, decides where to outsource the 
manufacturing tasks, and controls distribution and retailing through Apple stores as 
well agreements with mobile service providers in all target countries.  
 
The total manufacturing cost of a 3G iPhone (retail price US$500) is US$178.96, of 
which China accounts for US$6.5, about 3.6% of total cost, Japan US$49.25 
(33.9%), Korea US$22.96 (12.8%), Germany US$30.15 (16.8%), the US US$10.75 
(6.0%) and the rest of the world US$48.0 (26.8%). The gross profit, i.e. the value 
added of Apple, is US$321.4 per 3G iPhone, about 64% of total price (Xing and 
Detert, 2010). Assembly is the final stage of iPhone production, and since the launch 
of the first generation iPhone, Foxconn has been the exclusive assembler, so all 
ready-to-use iPhones available in the global market are shipped from China. Starting 
as a part of iPhone supply chains, China – the largest developing country – has 
emerged as the exclusive exporter of iPhones, even exporting iPhones to the US, 
where the iPhone was invented. 
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Several main factors have contributed to the rapid development of GVCs in the last 
few decades. First, the manufacturing industry has disintegrated: advancements in 
production technologies have made it possible to break the production process into 
distinct segments which can be spread around the world. Additionally, the Internet 
and mobile communication technology have greatly reduced transaction costs and 
simplified the once-complex cross border coordination between firms. Regardless of 
geographic distance and time zones, buyers and suppliers along value chains can 
easily engage in real time communication and coordination. Furthermore, the advent 
of container shipping and improvements in logistics efficiency have lowered 
transportation costs and made it possible for intermediate goods, such as parts and 
components, to cross borders repeatedly. This unprecedented globalization, which 
has substantially eliminated tariff and non-tariff barriers, has also stimulated the 
proliferation of GVCs by facilitating the mobility of capital and the flow of goods. 
Finally, the operating strategies of MNEs have changed fundamentally, from 
producing most of the value in their products through internally integrated firms to 
specialization in core competencies. Outsourcing non-core tasks and production of 
parts and components to external firms has been adopted as common choice for 
profit maximization (Kaplinsky, 2013). 
 
3. New Thinking on Trade under GVCs 
The complexity of trade relations  
Traditionally, exporting nations have been regarded as producers and importing 
countries as consumers. Trade relations between countries have been characterized 
as simply producer-consumer relationships; this is a dominant perception supporting 
mercantilism (the promotion of exports and the restriction of imports). Value chain 
based trade, quite distinct from the simple producer-consumer relationship, 
redefines the relationships between trading nations. Trade relations among countries 
involved in value chains have turned into partnerships. When countries import 
intermediate inputs such as parts and components from countries located 
downstream in value chains, those imports constitute necessary inputs of the 
exports or prerequisites for finishing tasks allocated by lead firms of GVCs. In other 
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words, without the imports, it is impossible to produce the exports and fulfill the tasks. 
Now, rather than simple producer-consumer relations, trade flows reflect the division 
of labor in tasks and cooperation between downstream and upstream countries. 
Many brand marketers and giant retailers, such as GAP, H&M and Walmart, have no 
production facilities. They usually concentrate on product design, brand promotion 
and product distribution. The shipment of ready-to-use products from assemblers or 
original equipment makers to the home market of these lead firms of value chains is 
an indispensable step towards the realization of the value of brands and distribution 
networks. Walmart currently imported some US$49 billion in goods from China in 
2013 (Scott, 2015). If counted as a country, Walmart would be China’s 8th largest 
importing nation. The bilateral trade flows between China and the US resulting from 
the outsourcing activities of Walmart present a new type of cooperative relationship 
between exporters and importers, who are responsible for distinct but interlinked 
tasks in value chains.  
Moreover, under GVCs, trade that used to be bilateral is now multilateral. The 
triangle trade formed by production networks in East Asia is a case in point.  At the 
center of the triangle trade, China imports intermediate inputs from Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, Singapore and other East Asian economies, assembles them into finished 
products, and eventually exports them to the US and European markets. The gross 
value of China’s exports includes not only domestic value added but also the value 
added of other East Asian economies, and thus should be counted as exports of 
East Asian economies, not simply China’s exports to these markets. Following the 
same logic, some part of the bilateral trade imbalance between China and the US is 
multilateral rather than bilateral. Clearly the source and destination markets of 
China’s processing trade outline the operation of China-centered value chains at 
country level. About 80% of China’s processing imports—necessary intermediate 
inputs of China’s processing exports—originates in East Asian economies, while 
more than 70% of China’s processing exports end up in US and European markets. 
As a result, China runs a large processing trade surplus with the US on the one 
hand and a significant trade deficit with Korea and Taiwan on the other. A 
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substantial part of China’s trade surplus with the US actually consists of transfers 
from other East Asian economies.  
Given the complexity of trade relationships under GVCs, it is very costly to impose 
protection measures. Restrictions may hinder domestic firms’ participation in GVCs 
and constrain their export capacities. If trade protection measures were imposed in a 
given country, both the consumers of the country and its producers would suffer. In 
addition, if tariff and non-tariff measures imposed by an individual country raised the 
cost of the final products, all countries involved in the value chains would be worse 
off. As bilateral trade relations have evolved into multilateral relations, and since the 
competitiveness of final products is now determined by combined national 
comparative advantage, unilateral actions may not be effective means of resolving 
bilateral trade imbalances.   
Measuring Trade in Value Added 
Conventional trade statistics measure the gross value of goods when they cross 
national borders. In the literature, economic interpretations of trade statistics 
implicitly assume that entire gross value is produced domestically by the exporting 
country. That assumption has dominated trade debates, negotiations and the 
evaluation of individual countries’ export capacity. There is no doubt that that 
assumption flies in the face of the reality of value chain trade. As argued above, the 
value added of a product manufactured along a value chain is attributed not to a 
single country, but to all the countries taking part in that GVC. While products evolve 
along value chains from raw materials, to parts, to semi-finished to final products, 
value is continually being added by firms specializing in different chain segments 
and located in different countries. Therefore, the gross value of exports and imports 
consists of an aggregate of domestic value added and foreign value added.  
Conventional trade statistics tend to exaggerate export volumes and provide 
misleading information on export capacity and comparative advantage. For example, 
although Chinese workers, specializing in assembly tasks, add a mere $6.5 to the 
US$178.96 manufacturing cost of a 3G iPhone, under the current system of trade 
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statistics, China is credited with value added of US$178.96 whenever a 3G iPhone is 
shipped abroad. The export of 11.3 million iPhones to the US in 2009 resulted in a 
$1.9 billion trade surplus for China. In fact, however, only 3.6% of the value 
originated in China, the rest being generated by Japan, Korea, Germany and other 
countries involved in the iPhone value chain (Xing and Detert, 2010).  
iPhone trade is not an isolated case. On average, foreign value added constitutes 
more than 55% of China’s high-tech exports, and more than 85% of processing 
exports with supplied materials (Xing, 2015). A recent study by UNCTAD (2013) 
shows that foreign value added accounted for 31% of the gross exports of 
developed economies, and 25% of those of developing economies, implying that 
double counting is a serious problem in current trade statistics, which fail to 
articulate the distribution of value added in exports over countries.  
Exports play a critical role in driving economic growth. To accurately assess the 
contribution of exports to national income, it is essential to measure trade in terms of 
value added. International organizations such as OECD and WTO have begun 
research towards the construction of a trade in value added database. The 
preliminary results are available on the OECD website. The WTO also initiated the 
“made in the world” concept in response to the collapse of the concept of country of 
origin of manufacturing goods (Lamy, 2011).  JETRO-IDE shows that if the value 
added approach were applied, the Sino-US trade surplus would be halved (IDE-
JETRO and WTO, 2012).   
In addition, conventional trade statistics may distort the estimates of comparative 
advantage and misrepresent dynamic changes in export composition. Economists 
use revealed comparative advantage as a proxy of national comparative advantage. 
Since a substantial portion of foreign value added is embedded in exports, revealed 
comparative advantage computed with gross value of trade tends to overestimate an 
economy’s comparative advantage in products and industries where imports 
constitute a significant portion of intermediate inputs. Trade statistics show that 
China is the world leading exporter of laptop computers, digital cameras, mobile 
phones and other ICT products; then clearly China should have revealed 
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comparative advantage in all those products. However, given that foreign MNEs own 
the intellectual property such as the brands and key components of those products, 
and low-tech parts production and assembly are performed by Chinese workers, the 
assumption that China has comparative advantage in those products is false. 
These odd trade phenomena, such as China’s export of iPhones to the US and 
China’s world leadership in high-tech exports, reflect improperly framed trade 
statistics which fail to identify sources of value added and cannot distinguish tasks 
from final products, and thus mistakenly suggest for example that everything 
shipped out of China was made there. This suggests that a value added (or task 
oriented) approach should be adopted for assessment of comparative advantage 
and dynamic changes in trade structures. Measuring trade in value added is 
imperative for accurate characterization of cross country distributions of whole value 
added of exports, for the purpose of identifying which countries have comparative 
advantage in which tasks, and the tracing of the roots of bilateral trade imbalances. 
This would serve to eliminate existing distortions and would present a more accurate 
picture of trade patterns and technology capacity across countries.  
The inclusion of developing countries in GVCs enables firms in those countries to 
perform low skilled tasks within the manufacture of high-tech products. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that those firms have acquired the necessary skills, 
technology and production know-how required for the independent creation of those 
high-tech products. Regardless of the tasks performed, using final products as an 
indicator of the technological level of firms participating in GVCs is misleading and 
misrepresents technological advancement and the evolution of trade structures 
(Xing, 2014). This could be remedied by considering task intensity and share of 
value added in assessments. The governments of developing countries often adopt 
preferential policies and fiscal subsidies to promote high-tech industry. Those 
policies should target the firms that perform high-value added tasks and produce key 
components, not the assemblers.   
Weakened Linkages between Trade and Exchange Rates 
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Exchange rates determine foreign goods prices in domestic currency, so they can 
influence consumer demand and trade flow. Conventional trade theory suggests that 
exchange rates play a central role in determining the competitiveness of a country in 
the world economy. If a country’s currency appreciates, its exports become more 
expensive and as a result foreign demand decreases, while imports become 
cheaper and demand for them increases. All this would lead to a decrease in the 
country’s trade surplus. This view of the interplay between exchange rates and trade 
implicitly assumes that the entire value-added of exports is produced domestically 
and thus all imports exclusively serve domestic consumption and investment. As 
argued above, the value added of products manufactured along GVCs cannot be 
attributed to any single country, but to all the countries involved in the process. 
Regardless of whether firms have monopolistic power and thus can engage in 
exchange rate pass-through, the currency appreciation of a single country can only 
affect the portion of value added generated in that country, which has a limited effect 
on the overall cost of products traded along value chains. In other words, GVCs 
mitigate elasticities of export and import demand to exchange rates. In the case of 
iPhone trade, if the Chinese yuan appreciated 50% against the US dollar, the total 
manufacturing cost would increase by at most $3.25 from the original $178.96, not 
by the predicted $89.50, because the appreciation of the yuan should only affect the 
costs incurred in China, and the foreign content embedded in the iPhone is 
unaffected by that appreciation. The economics literature and policy debates on the 
impact of exchange rates fail to distinguish fundamental differences between gross 
trade values and trade in value added. Furthermore, exchange rates of different 
countries usually do not move in the same direction. It is highly likely that, if the 
currency of the home country depreciated against the US dollar, the currencies of 
other countries along the relevant value chains would appreciate against the US 
dollar. The potential impact of home currency depreciation would be offset (and 
likely neutralized) by appreciation. Hence, assessment of the impact of exchange 
rates on value chain trade should focus on value added rather than gross trade 
value. It is essential to evaluate the combined effect of cross-country exchange rates, 
rather than movements of a single currency.  
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In macroeconomic models, imports proxy domestic demand for foreign goods and 
services. Countries participating in global production networks need to import a large 
quantity of parts and components for the production of exports. The quantities of 
imports used as inputs of exports are actually determined by foreign demand, not 
domestic demand. In general, the appreciation of home country currency would not 
affect the purchasing power of foreign consumers. Imports used for producing 
exports do not respond in the conventional fashion to the movements of exchange 
rates. Classifying imports according to purpose is essential for accurate 
determination of the relationship between imports and exchange rates. Xing (2012) 
shows that given a 10% real appreciation of the yuan, China’s processing imports 
would fall 5%. Using Belgian firm-level data, Amiti et al. (2013) determined that 
exporters that import a large share of inputs pass on a much smaller share of 
exchange rate shocks to exports prices. They argue that movements in the value of 
a country’s currency are positively correlated across its trade partners, and thus 
create a natural hedge against exchange rate movements and reduce the need for 
exporters to adjust their export market prices.  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes the real effective exchange rates 
(REER) of all its member countries. REER is based on gross trade flows and 
consumer price indexes, which are not compatible with trade flows through vertical 
specialization. Bems and Johnson (2012) propose a value-added REER, in which 
the weights of trading partners are calculated as bilateral trade in value added. 
Value-added REER takes global value chains into account in its assessments of 
competitiveness; this suggests that value-added REER can be used as an 
alternative means of evaluating the impact of exchange rates on the comparative 
advantage of countries participating in global production networks. The IMF has 
begun research towards adjusting its REER with trade in value added. 
 
Rules of Origins and Value Chain Trade 
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Rules of origin, the criteria for determining the national source of a product, are used 
in the implementation of trade measures and preferential treatment. Bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements apply rules of origin to determine which products 
are qualified for preferential treatment. In value chain trade, the country origins of 
goods have become blurred. For many manufactured products, it is almost 
impossible to identify a single country which accounts for 50% of total value added.  
Hence, it is now very challenging to clearly define country origin. The label “Made in 
China” attached to processing exports is often misleading, as more than 50% of their 
value added imported can be from abroad. In many cases, then, “Assembled in 
China” would be a more accurate description than “Made in China.” That is why 
WTO Secretary General Pascal Lamy called for the use of the “Made in the World” 
concept (Lamy, 2011).  
In practice, FTAs usually require a minimum of 40% domestic content for products to 
qualify for preferential treatment. Many firms participating in GVCs may not add 
more than 40% to the content of assembled products. Firms in developing countries 
rely mainly on their comparative advantage in low labor costs and thus specialize in 
low value added segments of GVCs. Domestic content of exports by firms in 
developing countries, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises, is generally 
less than 40%. For example, it is estimated the domestic value added of China’s 
processing exports with supplied materials is less than 15% (Xing, 2015).  Requiring 
a high percentage of local value added in FTAs poses the risk of excluding the firms 
in the low value added segments of GVCs, thus depriving them of opportunities to 
benefit from trade liberalization, and in the long run undermining the overall welfare 
effect of FTAs. The agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) adopts a “yarn 
forward” rule of origin, which requires that textile and apparel products be made of 
yarns and fabrics of TPP countries for the benefits of the agreement. In other words, 
if textile producers of TPP countries want to take advantage of the agreement, the 
value added of their products should be 100% produced within TPP countries. 
Textile products represent the largest item of Vietnam’s exports to the US. However, 
60-70% of yarn and fabrics in Vietnam is imported from non-TPP members.  If 
Vietnam’s textile producers cannot use locally produced yarns and fabrics, or source 
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from Japan, the US or other TPP countries, they will not be able to benefit from the 
agreement.  
The Delinking of Innovation and Job Creation 
The invention of the internal combustion engine, the train and the automobile 
created a huge number of jobs and greatly enhanced industrialization and 
urbanization in developed countries. Since globalization entered the second 
unbundling—the division of production processes worldwide and the global sourcing 
of inputs (Baldwin, 2011), the linkage between technological innovation and job 
creation has been weakened; now technological innovations may not necessarily 
generate significant domestic employment. In effect, the worldwide proliferation of 
GVCs has resulted in the geographic separation of product design and 
manufacturing, which in turn undermines the natural link between innovation and 
domestic employment. As MNEs—the global leaders of technological innovation—
increasingly concentrate on their core competencies, such as research and 
development, product design, manufacture of key components and brand promotion, 
more and more general manufacturing and assembly tasks are outsourced to foreign 
countries, where cheap and low skilled workers perform basic tasks. Product design 
and invention require far fewer workers than the production of sufficient quantities of 
products to meet global market demand. Usually, a few hundred genius level 
scientists and engineers are sufficient to design new products. On the other hand, 
the manufacture of parts and components and their assembly into finished products 
for export to various countries can require millions of workers. The separation of 
product design and manufacturing undercuts the employment creation potential of 
innovation in local economies. Growth without employment creation is now common 
in developed countries. The trend of de-industrialization in previously industrialized 
countries is a consequence of the GVC approach.    
In 1960, General Motors, Ford Motors and General Electric were the top employers 
in the US, providing American workers with 595,200, 260,000 and 260,600 jobs 
respectively (Cox et al, 2012). Today, Apple, which has a market value higher than 
the combined market value of those three American companies, employs about 
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43,000 workers in the US, while its foreign subcontractors, who manufacture all of 
Apple’’s i-products, employ about 700,000 workers. When President Obama asked 
Steve Jobs, “What would it take to make iPhones in the United States?”, Jobs’ reply 
was, “Those jobs aren’t coming back” (Duhigg and Bradsher, 2012). One senior 
Apple executive stated that a shortage of qualified American workers was the major 
reason for outsourcing Apple’s manufacturing work to China and other East Asian 
countries. Labor market mismatch may appear to be a reason for Apple’s gradual 
evolution into a factoryless high-tech company, but using GVCs to maximize profits 
must be the fundamental force driving not only Apple but also many other MNEs to 
build value chains and outsource some activities abroad. In the process, developing 
countries, which have comparative advantage in labor-intensive tasks, benefit 
tremendously in terms of employment and industrialization. The “de-industrialization” 
process in developed countries is now associated with the progress of 
industrialization in developing countries (Saeger, 1997).   
4.  GVCs and an Alternative Path to Industrialization 
A top development agenda item of low-income countries has always been the 
narrowing of the gap between them and developed countries and the pursuit of 
industrialization. Import substitution industrialization, the replacement of foreign 
imports with domestic production, dominated the development strategy of Latin 
American countries until 1990. The East Asian Miracle, marked by rapid 
industrialization and the successful transformation of the four Asian Tigers (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) into advanced high-income economies, 
triggered the development strategy paradigm shift from import substitution to export-
oriented industrialization, which promotes exports according to comparative 
advantage. In recent decades, the emergence of GVCs has revolutionized the 
nature and scope of export-oriented industrialization. The international division of 
labor in the world economy has evolved from the level of goods and industries to the 
more refined level of tasks. The fragmentation of production on a global scale 
provides ample opportunities for developing countries to participate in value chains 
and take advantage of their comparative advantage. Once integrated into GVCs, 
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firms from developing countries can now access the world market via established 
distribution networks, benefit from the growth of high-tech markets regardless of 
their disadvantage in technological capacity, take advantage of the spillover of 
brands and the lower information costs of reverse engineering—and proceed to 
catch up. 
To a large extent, new and fast growing markets are nurtured by technological 
innovation and the invention of products. Revolutionary innovations in information 
and communication technology (ICT) have given rise to a variety of new products, 
including laptop computers, smart phones and tablets, and thus dramatically 
increased consumer demand beyond the demand for traditional commodities. In 
2012, ICT goods emerged as one of the top product groups traded globally. World 
imports of ICT goods rose to US$2 trillion, about 11% of world merchandise trade, 
exceeding trade in agriculture and motor vehicles (UNCTAD, 2014). Most if not all of 
the intellectual property inherent in ICT products is owned by MNEs in developed 
countries. Unlike established MNEs, firms in developing countries have no 
comparative advantage in high-tech products, and thus are unlikely to be able to 
market products with their own intellectual property, or to compete with existing 
technology leaders. By specializing in low value added segments such as assembly 
and the production of low-tech components, they are able to join the value creation 
process of high-tech products and grow together with the lead firms. They can also 
enjoy spillover from globally recognized brands and intellectual property, which 
generally belong to the firms that direct value chains. Brands play a critical role in 
consumer purchasing decisions; demand for branded commodities tends to be 
stronger than that for non-branded goods. Consumers’ brand preferences can be 
carried over to the demand for tasks performed by all firms in value chains. Whether 
they own the intellectual property rights of brands or not, all firms taking part in 
buyer-driven value chains can benefit from the brand orientation of consumers. In 
short, GVCs offer an alternative path for developing countries to enter the global 
market and achieve industrialization.  
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A few Asian countries have successfully developed their industrial sectors through 
active participation in GVCs. The most noteworthy example is China, which has 
become the largest exporting nation in the world. The rapid growth and worldwide 
expansion of China’s exports are the result not only of intrinsic comparative 
advantage, but also to a large extent of spillover from GVCs in terms of the brands, 
global distribution networks and technology innovations of lead firms (Xing, 2016). 
An export-oriented growth strategy and the influx of foreign direct investment 
contributed greatly to the integration of Chinese manufacturing with GVCs. By 
specializing in the low value added segments of GVCs, Chinese firms have been 
able to bundle low skilled labor services with globally recognized brands and 
advanced technology and sell them to global consumers, driving the growth of 
China’s exports. Assembly is a low value added segment of ICT manufacturing, and 
thus suitable for China’s comparative advantage in low skilled labor services. Many 
Chinese companies, both local and foreign invested, have plugged themselves into 
ICT GVCs by concentrating on assembly tasks, and as a result have gradually 
transformed Chinese manufacturing into the assembly center of the global ICT 
industry and the top exporter of digital cameras, smart phones and laptop computers. 
In terms of value added per unit product, assembly contributes the least among all 
the tasks in value chains. However, given the huge scale of the global market, the 
aggregate value added of assembled ICT products exported from China to foreign 
markets is enormous; China’s processing exports are a pillar of its economic growth 
and employment. 
Thailand’s success in building its domestic automobile industry is an industry-
specific case of achieving industrialization through GVC participation. With output of 
1.5 million units in 2012, Thailand became the third largest commercial vehicle 
producer in the world, exporting automobiles, parts and accessories with a total 
value of $12.7 billion, the largest among Thai exports. The opening of Thai 
commerce to foreign direct investment and the integration of local automobile 
sectors into global automobile value chains are the main reasons for Thailand’s 
emergence as the auto export hub of ASEAN. After the Asian financial crisis, the 
Thai government fully liberalized foreign direct investment in the automotive sector 
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by abolishing the existing local content requirement and permitting 100% foreign 
ownership. These new policy initatives have attracted massive inflows of foreign 
investment into the sector, in particular investment by Japanese automakers such as 
Toyota and Nissan. MNEs usually extend their value chains abroad through green 
field investment. Foreign automakers not only target the local market, but also use 
Thailand as a platform for automobile export in the region. Unlike many developing 
countries, Thailand has never had the explicit goal of developing a national car. This 
has indirectly encouraged local firms to specialize in segments consistent with their 
comparative advantage. Thailand’s active participation in global automotive value 
chains has led over time to industrial upgrading and the subsequent deepening of 
the country’s technological capabilities in the sector. Local content has reached 80-
90% of total value added for pickup trucks and 30-50% for passenger cars 
assembled in Thailand (Techakanont, 2014).  
The successful experiences of China and Thailand indicate that the worldwide 
proliferation of value chains has lowered barriers and offered developing countries 
new opportunities to integrate their economies into the global market and thus 
benefit from globalization. To take advantage of GVCs, developing countries need 
industrial policy with four essential elements: the policy should focus on task 
capabilities rather than sectors or whole industries; assistance must be provided to 
domestic firms to systemically upgrade their capability and skills along value chains; 
relations with the lead firms governing GVCs must be nurtured so as to generate 
opportunities for participation in GVCs; and efficient infrastructure, including both 
transport logistics and ICT, must be established to ensure the smooth operation 
required by GVCs (i.e. industry policy needs to include investment in infrastructure 
(Kaplinsky, 2013)). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
International trade in manufactured products is now predominantly achieved through 
GVCs, which give rise to new opportunities for developing countries to participate in 
international markets and pursue industrialization. Value chain based trade has 
fundamentally changed the patterns of trade between developing and developed 
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countries, extended bilateral trade balances into multilateral ones, weakened the 
nexus between trade balances and exchange rates, and delinked product inventions 
and domestic unemployment. The challenges associated with the emergence of 
GVCs require an understanding of modern international trade, which in turn calls for 
new modes of thinking and new theories. Focusing on production process segments 
of GVCs, rather than on entire industries, is a promising strategy for achieving 
export-oriented industrialization.  
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